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And it was because Locke prized apart personal identity from biological identity, and any other sort of substance-based identity, that later philosophers like Joseph Butler and Thomas ... From this move, then, we get the Biological Criterion of Personal Identity: if X is a person at t1, and Y exists at any other time,
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plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-ethics/
plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-ethics/
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In this passage, Hobbes not only makes the distinction between identity at a time and identity over time and talks about the problem of identity over time as the comparison of the thing at different times, all of which have their echo in Locke, ... John Locke in his discussion of personal identity in Book II,
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www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Mode/ModeUzga.htm
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Some problems for the bodily identity theorist: How can you account for the fact that we seem to be able to imagine cases in which the same person switches bodies? How can you account for the apparent importance of issues of psychological continuity to our judgments about personal identity over time?
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www.amazon.com/Dialogue-Personal-Identity-Immortality/d...
www.amazon.com/Dialogue-Personal-Identity-Immortality/dp/0915144530
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In a few justly famous thought experiments, Locke argues against the view that personal identity consists in identity of immaterial soul over time and the view that it consists in identity of body over time.
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www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0520029607/researchsour...
www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ISBN=0520029607/researchsourcesA/
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This suggests that any account of personal identity in terms of psychological characteristics will have to have something to do with similarity over time. ... yet it is plain, consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended -- should it be to ages past- unites existences and actions very remote in time into the same person,
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www.nd.edu/~jspeaks/mcgill/201/winter2005/memory-theory...
www.nd.edu/~jspeaks/mcgill/201/winter2005/memory-theory.html
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From the time of Locke, discussions of personal identity have often ignored the question of our basic metaphysical nature: ... And he shows that each of these options has implications for a wide variety of philosophical topics--not just personal identity over time--and also that those topics have implications for each of...
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www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Philosophy/Mind/...
www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Philosophy/Mind/?view=usa&ci=9780195176421
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We cannot proceed with our daily lives, acquire knowledge, etc., unless it is true that things, including ourselves, are some way, and endure for some time. ... It is generally taken to show that continuity of consciousness cannot be what is meant by 'personal identity.' However, Butler has mistaken Locke's point, at least as...
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enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/carolynray...
enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/carolynray/diss/05.html
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One of these is the factual question of identity. This is the question of the conditions of personal identity over time. The other is the first person question of survival. ... What unites all the characters is a lack of inner fulfilment and a despair that is a result of permanently having to reinvent oneself.
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sas-space.sas.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/10065/1141/1/Julia...
sas-space.sas.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/10065/1141/1/Julian+Baggini+-+PhD+Thesis.pdf
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The book starts by arguing that the problem of personal identity over time is often wrongly put. The problem is usually stated like this: if you’ve got a person existing at one time and a person existing at another time, what has to be the case ... More specifically, I proposed, in the tradition of Aristotle and Locke,
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www.abstracta.pro.br/revista/SpecialIssueI/full_issue.p...
www.abstracta.pro.br/revista/SpecialIssueI/full_issue.pdf
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