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Whether we are organisms, or were once embryos, are substantive questions that an account of personal identity ought to answer, not matters to be settled in advance by the way we frame the debate. So we cannot assume at the outset that we are people (in something like Locke's sense) essentially.
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plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/
plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/
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By John Locke ... 9. Personal identity. This being premised, to find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands for; — which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places;
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newark.rutgers.edu/~jlynch/Texts/locke227.html
newark.rutgers.edu/~jlynch/Texts/locke227.html
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Reid on Locke and Personal Identity: Some Lost Sources ... Memory- duration- identity- personal identity: Locke and his dependence on ideas are a constant target here, but it was also important to Reid from an early point to break with Locke’s order of exposition and establish his own, in order to show the...
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www.luc.edu/philosophy/LockeStudies/articles/stewart-re...
www.luc.edu/philosophy/LockeStudies/articles/stewart-reid.htm
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Our questions about personal identity are questions about the necessary and sufficient conditions of being the same person as some independently identified person. ... Locke held that being conscious of A’s thoughts and experiences is a necessary and a sufficient condition of being the same person as A.
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pages.pomona.edu/~mjg14747/001-2006/LockePI.shtml
pages.pomona.edu/~mjg14747/001-2006/LockePI.shtml
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Locke argues that the identity of a person and the identity of a human are not coextensive. That is, it is possible for the same man to be more than one person over his lifetime, and it is ... Locke rejects alternative accounts of personal identity, most importantly the notion that sameness of soul means sameness of person.
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spruce.flint.umich.edu/~simoncu/380/lockeperson.htm
spruce.flint.umich.edu/~simoncu/380/lockeperson.htm
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Another alternative, which is similar to the psychological mode but not as obvious as the substantive, is John Locke's theory of personal identity. Locke claims that a person is the same person through time and space as long as that person can remember him/herself being that person.
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lirim98.tripod.com/Aca/locke.html
lirim98.tripod.com/Aca/locke.html
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daphne.palomar.edu/jmartin/Masher/Locke/Personal%20Iden...
daphne.palomar.edu/jmartin/Masher/Locke/Personal%20Identity/index.htm
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• Locke even says that personal identity can continue to several [different] substances by means of the consciousness we have of our thoughts and actions, which he identifies as the consciousness of self to itself now.
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www.carroll.edu/~msmillie/philhumbeing/lockepersonalide...
www.carroll.edu/~msmillie/philhumbeing/lockepersonalidentity.htm
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